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Abstract
Consumer prices are not very responsive to movements in nominal exchange rates and
their response has fallen in Canada since the mid 1980s. This paper explores two of the
most likely explanations for this decline in exchange rate pass-through to consumer prices:
(1) lower inﬂation and (2) restructuring in the retail sector. We believe that both explana-
tions are important but our primary focus in this paper is on the second explanation. We
discuss the restructuring that has occurred in Canadian retail and trends in mark-ups and
concentration in that sector. We argue that to understand these trends, it is important to
examine pass-through in industrial organization models with strategic elements. Finally, we
present a series of such models and evaluate the eﬀects of various forms of restructuring on
mark-ups, concentration, and exchange rate pass-through.
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11 Introduction
It has been extensively documented that consumer prices are not very responsive to move-
ments in nominal exchange rates. Recently, it has also been argued that these prices have
become considerably less responsive in Canada since the mid 1980s. This paper explores two
of the most likely explanations for the apparent fall in the response of consumer prices to
exchange rate ﬂuctuations: (1) lower inﬂation and (2) restructuring in the retail sector, with
particular focus on the second explanation.
It is important to gain insight into the connections between nominal exchange rate move-
ments and consumer prices as this relationship has implications for both monetary and
exchange rate policy. If the relationship is weak, the expenditure-shifting eﬀects of mone-
tary shocks are diminished. Indeed, the arguments made by Friedman (1952) and Feldstein
(1997) for ﬂexible exchange rates rely extensively on nominal exchange rate movements be-
ing passed through to consumer prices. If consumer prices are unresponsive, relative price
adjustments will not occur and exchange rates may not act as automatic stabilizers.
Furthermore, a better understanding of this association may provide important insights
into the factors that inﬂuence price determination. This endeavor may allow us to quantify
the relative importance of macroeconomic factors such as monetary and ﬁscal policy and
inﬂation and microeconomic factors such as market structure on the price-setting behaviour
of ﬁrms.
It is especially important to understand why the relationship may have changed. A
particularly interesting question is whether or not monetary policy inﬂuences the degree
to which prices respond to exchange rate movements (that is, the degree of exchange rate
pass-through). Taylor (2001), for example, argues that lower pass-through of costs to prices
should not be taken as exogenous to the inﬂationary environment. Furthermore, a number
of researchers have presented both time series and cross- country evidence of a positive
relationship between inﬂation and exchange rate pass-through (for example, Devereux and
Yetman (2003) and Choudhri and Hakura (2006)). This evidence has led some to speculate
that the shift in monetary policy in Canada in the early 1990s toward lower inﬂation may
have contributed to lower exchange rate pass-through.
We discuss two theoretical approaches in the literature which are capable of generating a
positive relationship between inﬂation and exchange rate pass-through. One approach relies
on nominal rigidities and argues that inﬂation inﬂuences ﬁrms’ decisions as to the degree
to which their prices should respond to movements in the exchange rate. Another approach
focuses on consumer search and argues that inﬂation inﬂuences consumers’ decisions to search
2over prices, which, in turn, aﬀects the market power of ﬁrms and, therefore, their ability to
pass-through exchange rate movements into their prices.
We then consider the hypothesis that changes in the retail sector in Canada that began
in the late 1980s may have contributed to the fall in exchange rate pass-through to retail
prices. We discuss the forces that have led to restructuring in that industry and examine
trends in industry concentration and mark-ups over the last twenty years. This approach
to explaining the fall in pass-through implicitly assumes that prices are determined in an
environment in which ﬁrms interact strategically. With this in mind, we analyze a series of
industrial organization models of price setting and evaluate the eﬀects of various forms of
restructuring on pass-through in those models.
A strategic approach to examine the relationship between exchange rates and prices has
ﬁrm foundations in the microeconomic literature on pass-through which was developed be-
ginning in the late 1980s. A recent survey by Amirault, Kwan and Wilkinson (2005) of
the price-setting behaviour of Canadian ﬁrms provides empirical motivation for a strategic
approach to price setting. Their results suggest, for example, that the number of competi-
tors in an industry is a very important determinant of the frequency of price adjustments.
Furthermore, ﬁrms that reported that the frequency of their price changes had increased
over the past decade indicated that the most important factor generating this increase was
increased competition.
A focus on strategic considerations to explore the forces that may have caused the decline
in pass-through in Canada stands in contrast to many of the more recent macroeconomic
models of exchange rate pass-through with nominal rigidities. Those models typically assume
a market structure and a form for consumer preferences such that ﬁrms do not interact
strategically, but instead price at a constant mark-up over marginal cost (or over expected
marginal cost). This approach implicitly focuses attention on the link between inﬂation
and pass-through as mark-up ﬂuctuations must be associated with nominal rigidities in this
framework.
We conclude that both lower inﬂation and restructuring in the retail sector are important
for explaining observed lower pass-through of exchange rates to consumer prices in Canada.
These factors should be seen as complementary and may have reinforced one another in
lowering pass-through.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the evidence on
declining pass-through and the relationship between pass- through and inﬂation. Section
3 highlights the relationship between mark-up responses and price responses to exchange
rate movements and clariﬁes the underlying factors which determine the magnitude of pass-
3through. Section 4 describes theoretical research aimed at addressing the positive relation-
ship between inﬂation and pass-through. Section 5 discusses trends in Canadian retailing.
Section 6 brieﬂy discusses industrial organization approaches to examining pass-through.
Sections 7 and 8 present a series of such models and analyzes the ability of diﬀerent forms
of restructuring to generate the retailing trends discussed in Section 5. Section 9 concludes.
2 Exchange Rate Pass-Through Evidence
2.1 Pass-Through Estimation
The standard deﬁnition of exchange rate pass-through is the percentage change in local
currency import prices resulting from a one percent change in the exchange rate between
the exporting and importing countries. Goldberg and Knetter (1997) discuss the general
approaches in the literature to measuring this form of exchange rate pass-through. As they
explain, researchers typically perform a regression analysis of the following form to estimate
pass-through:
pt = α + δXt + γEt + ψZt +  t (1)
where p is the local currency import price, X is a measure of exporter’s cost, Z may include
import demand shifters, and E is the exchange rate. The coeﬃcient γ is the pass-through
coeﬃcient and pass-through is complete if γ = 1 and incomplete if γ<1. Their paper
provides a good survey of empirical studies which have estimated these coeﬃcients at the
aggregate level and at the industry level. They conclude that most studies focused on the
U.S. and estimated the pass-through coeﬃcient to be around 60% for that country.
Several authors have estimated exchange rate pass-through to import prices for a variety
of countries and industries since Goldberg and Knetter wrote their survey article. Campa
and Goldberg (2004) provide estimates for the OECD countries using quarterly data from
1975 to 1999. They estimate average pass-through to import prices across the countries in
their sample to be .61 in the short-run and .77 in the long-run (one year). For Canada, their
estimates are quite close to the average: .65 and .68 respectively. They also provide estimates
for sub-aggregates of import prices (food, energy, raw materials, manufacturing products,
and non-manufacturing products) and ﬁnd that most industries exhibit only partial pass-
through in the short-run.
Kardasz and Stollery (2001) provide pass-through estimates to prices of both imports
and domestically produced goods using data from 1972-1989 for thirty-three Canadian man-
ufacturing industries. Their estimate of the average exchange rate pass-through elasticity is
4.13 for domestic goods and .26 for imported goods and they found substantial variation is
pass-through across the industries in their sample.
More recently, researchers have also become interested in measuring and understanding
the percentage change in local currency consumer or retail prices (which includes both im-
ported and domestic goods) resulting from a one percent change in the exchange rate. The
increased attention on pass-through to consumer prices has been partially fueled by theoret-
ical models which examine pass-through and real exchange rate behaviour in environments
where exporting ﬁrms set consumer prices in local currencies. The simplest versions of these
models assume that prices are set prior to the realization of the nominal exchange rate and
predict zero pass-through to consumer prices. The prevalence of these models and their
stark predictions have made it increasingly important to gain a better understanding of the
behaviour of exchange rate pass-through to consumer prices.
Estimates of pass-through to consumer prices has typically been estimated to be signiﬁ-
cantly lower than to import prices. Duguay (1994) and Leung (2003) provide estimates for
Canada and found that the long-run exchange rate elasticity to the aggregate consumer price
index and to the consumer price index excluding food and energy were around 20% prior to
the mid 1980s. 1
2.2 Changes in Exchange Rate Pass-Through
Recently, many economists have speculated that pass-through of exchange rates to both
import prices and consumer prices have been declining. Campa and Goldberg (2004) use
two types structural break tests on their import price regressions and conclude that there
has been a tendency toward declines in pass-through, but the decline was signiﬁcant in only
a small number of cases. Otani, Shiratsuka, and Shirota (2003) provide evidence of a fall
in exchange rate pass-through to the price of imports in Japan for a large set of goods.
McCarthy (2000) also ﬁnds evidence of lower levels of pass-through to import prices for a set
of nine OECD countries during the period from 1983-1998 than during 1976-1982. Gagnon
and Ihrig (2001), using data from 1971-2000 for twenty countries, also conclude that pass-
through to consumer prices has fallen since the 1980s. Frankel, Parsley, and Wei (2005)
ﬁnd a downward trend in pass-through to imported goods prices and the CPI using a set of
seventy-six countries.
Researchers focused on the Canadian experience have argued that pass-through to con-
1Note, however, that these estimates are not much lower than those found by Kardasz and Stollery (2001)
using Canadian import prices in manufacturing.
5sumer prices in Canada has fallen during the last ten to ﬁfteen years. Indeed, the Bank of
Canada Monetary Report (2000) argues that pass-through to core CPI has fallen in Canada
since the mid-1980s even though the import content in core CPI has risen. This argument is
based partially on a discussion of the Canadian experience presented in Laﬂ´ eche (1996-1997).
Leung (2003) performs structural break tests on exchange rate pass-through regressions and
ﬁnds evidence of breaks in the mid 1980s. He also ﬁnds that both short and long run pass-
through elasticities are statistically insigniﬁcant when estimated using consumer price data
from the mid 1980s to 2002.
2.3 Inﬂation and Exchange Rate Pass-Through
These declines in exchange rate pass-through coincided with a time period in which average
inﬂation rates in the developed world also fell. These two trends have led some researchers
to speculate that lower inﬂation is related to lower pass-through and further, may cause
pass-through to decline (see the Bank of Canada Monetary Report (2000)). In the next
section, we discuss theoretical models which address this relationship but here we brieﬂy
discuss empirical evidence of a positive relationship between inﬂation and pass-through.
Campa and Goldberg (2004) use cross-country regressions to address this issue and show
that country-speciﬁc rates of pass-through to import prices are not signiﬁcantly related to
inﬂation or money growth in their sample. However, Devereux and Yetman (2003) use
a similar approach with a sample of 120 countries and conclude that both the level and
volatility of inﬂation are positively related to exchange rate pass-through to the consumer
price index. Choudhri and Hakura (2006) ﬁnd a similar result for consumer prices for the
period from 1979-2000 in a set of seventy-one countries. Gagnon and Ihrig (2001) also ﬁnd a
positive relationship between the stability of inﬂation and pass-through to the CPI, however,
they ﬁnd much weaker evidence of a link between monetary policy and pass-through. Frankel,
Parsley, and Wei (2005) argue that only part of the downward trend in pass-through can be
explained by changes in monetary factors, including inﬂation.
3 Exchange Rate Pass-Through Preliminaries
Below, we use the basic deﬁnition of the mark-up of price over marginal cost to derive
relationships between cost ﬂuctuations, mark-up ﬂuctuations, and pass-through shifts. This
approach allows us to provide insights into the possible forces that may have contributed to
the decline in exchange rate pass-through to consumer prices in Canada.
63.1 Mark-ups and Pass-Through
Consider the following model of a retail industry. Suppose there are n retailers who produce
ﬁnal goods for sale in the domestic market using constant-returns-to-scale technologies. The
goods that they sell could be homogeneous or diﬀerentiated. Retailers use two types of
inputs: domestic inputs which are priced in domestic currency and imported inputs which
are priced in foreign currency. Retailers are price takers in all input markets. Associated with
the technologies used by retailers are unit cost functions denominated in domestic currency.
This cost function is a function of the price of domestic inputs, w (expressed in domestic
currency), the price of imported inputs, wF (expressed in foreign currency), and the spot
exchange rate, s (domestic currency per unit of foreign currency). We denote this function
for retailer j as follows:
cj(s,w,wF).
The mark-up is deﬁned as the ratio of price to unit cost. We denote the mark-up for
retailer j by mj and by deﬁnition have the following basic relationship:
pj = mjcj(s,w,wF), (2)
where pj is the domestic currency price of the ﬁnal good sold by retailer j. Now, in general,
the mark-up can depend upon a number of variables including the properties of the demand
function, the number of retailers, the market structure, own costs, rivals’ costs, etc. Clearly,
if the mark-up depends on costs, then changes in the exchange rate which aﬀect costs will
also aﬀect mark-ups.
Logging and diﬀerentiating equation (??) with respect to the log of the exchange rate











ˆ psj =ˆ msj +ˆ csj (4)
If ˆ psj < 1, then pass-through is said to be incomplete while if ˆ psj = 1, pass-through is
complete for retailer j.
To better understand this relationship, consider the case in which movements in the
exchange rate are fully passed through to costs (ˆ csj = 1). This would be the case, for
example, if there were no domestic inputs and retailers simply resold imported goods at a
mark-up over costs. In this case then, pass-through will be incomplete if and only if the
mark-up falls in response to an exchange rate depreciation (ˆ msj < 0). This implies, of
7course, that when prices are a constant mark-up over marginal cost, pass-through will be
complete. Now if exchange rate movements are not fully passed through to costs, as would
be the case for Cobb-Douglas technologies with an imported input and a domestic input,
then pass-through will be incomplete when the mark-up is constant.
We can expand on the above by denoting the mark-up as
mj(c,Ωj),
where c =( c1,c 2,...,c n) is the vector of retailers’ costs and Ωj is a vector of non-cost
variables which aﬀect the mark-up of retailer j (for example, the number of ﬁrms, demand
parameters, the nature of competition, etc.). We assume that Ωj is independent of the




(ˆ mij)(ˆ csi), (5)
where ˆ mij =
∂ lnmj





ˆ mijˆ csj +( 1+ˆ mjj)ˆ csj. (6)
As equation (??) makes clear, diﬀerences in pass-through across industries or across time
must be explained by two factors: (1) diﬀerences in how exchange rates are passed-through
to costs and (ˆ csj) and (2) diﬀerences in how changes in costs aﬀect mark-ups (ˆ mij). We now
discuss some of these factors.
3.2 Factors aﬀecting pass-through
There are many factors which aﬀect the relationship between exchange rate movements and
cost movements. For example, the production technology and the relative importance of
imported inputs compared to domestic inputs in that technology inﬂuence this relationship.
In particular, ﬁrms or countries which rely more on imported inputs will tend to have a higher
degree of pass-through of exchange rate movements to costs. The location of production
certainly inﬂuences this as well, so the amount of outsourcing has an eﬀect. Furthermore, the
relationship between retailers and wholesalers and each party’s bargaining power aﬀects the
type of contracts they write and inﬂuences each party’s exposure to exchange rate movements.
The relationship between cost movements and mark-up movements is clearly aﬀected
by demand conditions. Market structure considerations such as the number of ﬁrms in
an industry, their degree of market power, and the nature of competition in the industry
certainly inﬂuence this relationship as well. Thus any policy, including monetary policy,
8which aﬀects market structure could inﬂuence the degree of pass-through. A more subtle
point but one which is clariﬁed in the next section is that the degree of nominal rigidities in
a market will impact on the relationship between costs and mark-ups. Hence, if monetary
policy, through its eﬀect on inﬂation, aﬀects the degree of nominal rigidities, then that policy
will inﬂuence the relationship between mark-ups and costs and will aﬀect pass-through.
This approach suggests that explanations for the fall in exchange rate pass-through to
prices in Canada will ultimately be explanations for why there has been a fall in pass-through
of exchange rates to costs or why there has been an change in the response of mark-ups to
cost movements or both. We begin by examining two approaches which suggest that the
shift in monetary policy in Canada toward lower inﬂation has aﬀected these relationships
and, hence, exchange rate pass-through to prices.
4 Inﬂation and Pass-Through
This section considers the conjecture that changes in pass-through behavior may be the
result of changes in monetary policy. In particular, we explore the hypothesis that the shift
in monetary policy in Canada in the 1990’s toward lower inﬂation has led to lower exchange
rate pass-through in Canada. Indeed, as discussed previously, this was an argument made
in the Bank of Canada’s Monetary Policy Report (2000).
4.1 Models with Nominal Rigidities
Several papers in the open economy macroeconomics literature have examined exchange rate
pass-through (or deviations from the Law of One Price) in models with nominal rigidities.
Typically, these models generate incomplete pass-through in the following manner. First,
they assume that ﬁrms selling in international markets set their prices in the currency of the
market in which they are selling (local currency pricing). Secondly, these models incorporate
a nominal rigidity by making one or more of the following assumptions: (1) Each period,
ﬁrms choose prices before observing exchange rates, (2) There is some probability that any
particular ﬁrm will be allowed to change their price in any period (see Calvo(1983)), (3)
Firms set their prices every n periods in a staggered fashion (see Taylor (1980)), or (4)
Firms must pay a cost to adjusting their price (menu costs). Models which incorporate
the ﬁrst assumption will generate zero sort-run pass-through of exchange rate movements
to prices while the remaining assumptions will generate positive but incomplete short-run
pass-through.
9There are at least two explanations in this literature for a positive relationship between
inﬂation and pass-through in the presence of nominal rigidities. In the ﬁrst explanation, the
inﬂation level aﬀects ﬁrms’ perceptions of the persistence of an exchange rate movement,
which aﬀects their response to such movements when setting prices. In the second expla-
nation, the inﬂation level aﬀects a ﬁrm’s losses associated with not changing prices, and so
aﬀects its decision as to the frequency of costly change prices in response to exchange rate
movements.
We brieﬂy describe a paper by Taylor (2000) which oﬀers the ﬁrst explanation. He
incorporates staggered price setting as described in method (3) above to examine pass-
through of costs to prices. Because ﬁrms can only change their prices every four periods, the
extent to prices respond to a movement in the exchange rate (and hence a change in the costs
for importers) is increasing in the number of ﬁrms which can change prices in the period
and the expected persistence of exchange rate ﬂuctuations. He also argues that economies
with low inﬂation are less likely to experience a persistent nominal depreciation because
this would lead to extended periods of real exchange rate depreciations. Thus, low inﬂation
economies or time periods should exhibit less pass-through than economies or episodes with
high inﬂation.
An example of the second explanation is the paper by Devereux and Yetman (2002).
They explore an environment in which ﬁrms face some exogenous probability that they will
be able to change their price and an environment in which ﬁrms can adjust their price in
any period at some cost. Here, we brieﬂy describe the second environment and their results.
In their model, ﬁrms import a consumer good and sell it to local consumers. The ﬁrm
faces a cost of changing their price from one period to the next. Under higher inﬂation,
ﬁrms which do not adjust prices experience loses in their real return due to exchange rate
depreciations which increase their costs. Furthermore, increases in the variance of inﬂation
will raise their expected losses from keeping their prices ﬁxed for long periods of time. Since
price adjustments are costly to ﬁrms, ﬁrms will adjust prices by less when the losses from
not changing prices is low – that is, during periods of low and stable inﬂation.
We now frame these types of models with nominal rigidities in the basic approach dis-
cussed in the previous section which links mark-up and cost elasticities to price elasticities.
Suppose retailers in that model must set prices each period before observing the exchange
rate, and hence, before observing costs. As is typical in models with nominal rigidities, sup-
pose the ﬁrms are in a monopolistically competitive industry and each ﬁrm faces a constant-
elasticity of demand function with elasticity equal to η>0. The pricing policy for ﬁrm j





















Now because of the nominal rigidity assumption, price and, therefore, Fj(·) cannot respond
to the realization of the exchange rate. So, we have
ˆ msj = −ˆ csj
and, from equation (??),
ˆ psj =ˆ msj +ˆ csj =0 .
So we see that the actual mark-up (in contrast to the expected mark-up) falls in proportion
to a rise in costs because prices cannot respond to cost shocks and so pass-through equals
zero. If a subset of ﬁrms can change their prices each period (as in Taylor(2002) or the ﬁrst
model of Devereux and Yetman (2003)), then pass-through to those prices will be complete
but pass-through to a price index will be incomplete because other ﬁrms have zero pass-
through each period. Furthermore, monetary policy, which aﬀects the level and persistence
of inﬂation, inﬂuences how much the average mark-ups respond to exchange rate movements
because it aﬀects how much ﬁrms change their prices (as in Taylor (2002)) or how often they
change their prices, or both (as in Devereux and Yetman (2003)).
We conclude by noting that these models and related work which incorporate nominal
rigidities and local currency pricing to study incomplete pass-through and the closely related
issues of deviations from the law of one price and purchasing power parity have been criticized
on a number of grounds. Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (2000), for example, argue that models which
rely on local currency pricing are implausible because this assumption is inconsistent with
evidence on the currency of trade invoicing. They also suggest that the high degree of
stickiness in consumer prices needed by these models to generate persistent deviations from
purchasing power parity is inconsistent with micro evidence of the frequency of price changes.
In other work which focuses on the dynamics of international prices, Chari, Kehoe, and
McGratten (2002) suggest that to explain the dynamics of real exchange rates, these types of
models require price stickiness of at least one year. This level of price stickiness is generally
inconsistent with the evidence presented by Bils and Klenow (2004) on consumer prices
which indicate that half of the prices in their sample last 4.3 months or less. It is also
inconsistent with the ﬁndings of Amirault, Kwan, and Wilkinson (2005) based a recent
11survey of Canadian ﬁrms’ price setting behaviour. They ﬁnd that one-half of ﬁrms in Canada
change their prices at least once every three months. They also report that approximately
one-third of the respondents now change their prices more frequently than they did a decade
ago while slightly more than half of the ﬁrms have not changed the frequency of their price
setting. This evidence on changes in price ﬂexibility in Canada is diﬃcult to reconcile with
the nominal rigidities explanation for lower pass-through.
One might also conjecture that the costs of adjusting prices has fallen in the 1990’s due
to advances in computers and other technologies which aﬀect inventory control. If this is
the case in Canada, then the explanation oﬀered by Devereux and Yetman which relies on a
constant cost of price adjustment in the presence of low inﬂation since the early 1990’s may
be weakened.
To summarize, there is a class of models with nominal rigidities which generate the inter-
esting qualitative result that pass-through is increasing in inﬂation. These models, however,
have diﬃculty addressing the quantitative dynamic properties of exchange rate pass-through
without what appears to be excessive price stickiness. This approach, then, may explain
some of the fall in exchange rate pass-through in Canada but there appear to be other
contributing factors.
4.2 Models with Consumer Search
In this section, we describe the model of Head, Kumar, and Lapham (2006) which incorpo-
rates costly consumer search without any exogenously imposed nominal rigidities. The paper
examines the response of real and nominal prices to cost and money growth shocks. Here,
we describe the behavior of prices in response to cost shocks, which could be interpreted as
exchange rate shocks for ﬁrms which are importing goods for resale in the domestic market.
The model generates incomplete pass-through and a positive relationship between inﬂation
and pass-through.
In their environment, there is a continuum of sellers and a continuum consumers. Con-
sumers know the distribution of prices but cannot freely observe the prices posted by an
individual seller. Rather, they must pay a search cost for each price they choose to observe.
Burdett and Judd (1983) demonstrate that equilibrium in this type of search environment
will be characterized by a non-degenerate distribution of prices across sellers producing the
same good. Because search over prices is costly for consumers, sellers have market power
and can price above their marginal cost. Not surprisingly, then, mark-ups are decreasing
in the search intensity of consumers. Furthermore, ﬁrms which charge high prices will typi-
12cally sell to consumers who only observe one price. Thus, these high-priced ﬁrms will have
more market power than ﬁrms which charge low prices (who typically sell to consumers who
observe multiple prices.)
We ﬁrst explain how this model generates incomplete pass-through. Suppose the marginal
cost for all sellers increases (for example, the nominal exchange rate depreciates, increasing
the costs for retailers which sell imported goods). Sellers pricing in diﬀerent parts of the
price distribution will respond to this diﬀerently so (under certain restrictions on the utility
function) this will lead to increased price dispersion. This increased dispersion, in turn,
increases the beneﬁt to consumers of searching for more price quotes so search intensity will
rise. This increase in search intensity will decrease the market power of all sellers and will
lower the average mark-up. The only way this can happen is if the cost increase leads to a
less than proportional price increase – that is, if pass-through is incomplete.
We now turn to the relationship between pass-through and inﬂation in the model. In
equilibrium, a higher average rate of inﬂation is associated with a higher average degree of
search intensity. The reasons for this are similar to those for incomplete pass-through of cost
shocks. As the inﬂation rate rises, buyers are more willing to spend money, thus allowing
sellers to raise their prices. Again, may increase in response to the cost shock for a ﬁxed
degree of search intensity. Increased price dispersion, however, raises the returns to search
and thus induces buyers to increase their search intensity.
As a result, the fraction of buyers observing a single price (and thus the fraction of high
market power sellers) is lower the higher is average inﬂation, in a stationary equilibrium.
In response to a cost shock, the fewer high market power sellers there are, the weaker the
increase in price dispersion arising from diﬀerential pass-through. This in turn results in
a smaller increase in search intensity, and thus the pass-through of cost shocks rises with
average inﬂation.
Again, to relate this model to the general approach of Section 3, consider a version of
this model where the ﬁrms simply import goods for resale and so the elasticity of cost with




ˆ mij +( 1+ˆ mjj). (9)
In the search environment, a ﬁrm’s mark-up will respond symetrically to a change in any of
its rival’s costs so ˆ mij =ˆ mi j for i,i   = j. If we denote this elasticity as ˆ mrj, and assume
there is a unit measure of ﬁrms, then (??) becomes
ˆ psj =1+ˆ mrj +ˆ mjj. (10)
13Hence, as explained above, pass-through will be incomplete because a rise in costs due to an
exchange rate depreciation increases consumer search which causes ﬁrm’s mark-ups to fall
so ˆ mrj < 0 and ˆ mjj < 0. Thus, monetary policy which aﬀects inﬂation and, thus, consumer
search, aﬀects pass-through because it changes the response of mark-ups to cost ﬂuctuations.
To summarize this approach and relate this model to the Canadian experience, the hy-
pothesis here is that the shift in monetary policy in Canada in the early 1990’s toward lower
inﬂation induced Canadian consumers to spend less time and resources searching for bar-
gains. This gave Canadian retailers more market power so that movements in the exchange
rate induced a larger increase in price dispersion than when inﬂation was high. This increased
dispersion generated a bigger increase in consumer search to the exchange rate movement.
The more intense search response decreased ﬁrms willingness to pass-through exchange rate
ﬂuctuations to their prices.
An interesting feature of this approach is that pass-through is incomplete in this model
because ﬁrms have market power. Furthermore, shifts in the degree of pass-through are
explained by changes in market power induced by changes in monetary policy. Thus, this
model suggests a link between the microeconomic characteristics of an industry and the
properties of pass-through in the industry. In Sections 6-8 we pursue this link more fully
and consider industrial organization models of exchange rate pass-through. Before doing so,
however, we now explore other forces (in addition to shifts in monetary policy) that have
changed the market power of Canadian retailers by changing the market structure in that
industry. We brieﬂy discuss trends in some of the characteristics of market structure in
Canadian retailing such as concentration and the “degree of competition.” We suggest that
these trends in the market structure of retailing may have, in turn, aﬀected the degree of
pass-through to Canadian retail prices.
5 Canadian Retailing Trends
5.1 General Restructuring
The retail sector in Canada and the United States has changed considerably over the last
twenty-ﬁve years. It has seen entry and expansion of large scale ﬁrms (“big-box” retail-
ers) particularly in the 1990s and exit of many smaller retailers. The United States Free
Trade Agreement in 1989 (FTA) and the North American Free Trade Agreement in 1992
(NAFTA) also aﬀected the sector, but to a lesser extent than the manufacturing sector.
Dramatic changes in information technology, inventory management, and the introduction
14of the internet were also seen during this time period. These changes have led to a shift in
the relationship between retailers and manufacturers with bargaining power shifting toward
large retailers. In this section, we discuss some of these changes in detail based on surveys
and articles which examine trends in retail.
We begin with a brief description of some of the ﬁndings of a general survey of restructur-
ing in Canada by Kwan (2000). This paper presents the results of a survey of 140 Canadian
companies regarding the extent and timing of their restructuring activities during the 1980s
and 1990s. Approximately 87% of the companies surveyed claimed that they undertook re-
structuring in the 1990s and 36% reported that they did so in the 1980s. In the wholesale
and retail trade sector, the percentages are 86% and 27% respectively. The most common
form of restructuring was adoption of a new technology but a signiﬁcant percentage of ﬁrms,
particularly in the retail sector identiﬁed restructuring activities which led to an increase in
the size of their operations. In particular, focusing on the 1990s, approximately one-quarter
of the respondents merged with another ﬁrm and one-quarter moved to fewer but larger
establishments. Furthermore, 56% of ﬁrms in the retail sector stated that they introduced
diﬀerent formats for retail outlets which Kwan interprets as a reﬂection of “...more aggressive
expansion strategies by ’big box’ retailers...”
The survey also examines the reasons for restructuring. In the 1990s, nearly half of the
ﬁrms surveyed indicated that availability of new technology was an important factor in their
decision to restructure. Interestingly, in the wholesale and retail trade sector, two-thirds
of the ﬁrms indicated that greater competition from Canadian ﬁrms was important while
more than one-half indicated greater competition from U.S. ﬁrms. Only 5% of the ﬁrms
indicated that a major change in the exchange rate led them to restructure while 18% cited
the FTA and NAFTA. To summarize, Kwan’s survey results suggest that retail restructuring
in Canada entailed adoption of new technologies and an increase in average establishment
size. Furthermore, an important factor behind these changes was greater competition in
the sector.
A number of authors have discussed the speciﬁcs of technological changes that have signif-
icantly aﬀected retailing in North America, including the adoption of the Universal Product
Code system, improvements in the ability of suppliers and retailers to share information,
changes in inventory tracking and management procedures, and the rise of automated dis-
tribution centres which ensure smooth and rapid distribution. Dunlop and Rivkin (1999)
argue that large adoption costs associated with these and other advances in technology com-
bined with the resulting lower marginal costs has led to fewer, low-cost ﬁrms, with high sales
volume. Abernathy, et.al. (1995) examine the impact of these technological advances in the
15apparel industry in the U.S. and argue that one eﬀect has been increased concentration of
this industry and an increase in market power for retailers on their suppliers.
Christensen and Tedlow (2000) identify major disruptions in the evolution of the retail
industry. In particular, they argue that in recent years, some discount department stores
were replaced by specialized discount stores (“category killers” such as Toys-R-Us and Circuit
City) and by more eﬃcient, large scale, discount retailers such as Wal-Mart. Jones and
Doucet (2000) examine retail trends in the Toronto area and argue that “The most signiﬁcant
structural change to the North American urban retail economy in recent years has been the
introduction of a variety of new retail forms – normally called ‘big boxes’ or ‘category killers.”’
They go on to state that “These retail formats have introduced a new form of competition
to almost every retail category.” According to these authors, growth of big box retailers in
Canada accelerated beginning in 1992 and peaked in 1995 with 320 big box retailers operating
in Toronto in 2000. They further estimate that retail giants Wal-Mart, Home Depot, Ikea,
and Toys R Us had between 19% and 44% of retail sales in their respective markets in the
greater Toronto area in 2000.
As noted above, technological changes and the emergence of large retailers have shifted the
balance of power from suppliers (manufacturers) toward retailers. Kumar (1996) examines
this phenomenon and argues that the relationship began to change in the mid-1980s in the
United States. Dunlop and Rifkin (1999) argue that prior to the adoption of the technologies
described above that manufacturing companies had better information regarding demand
because they were selling to a large number of retailers. In contrast, since the early to mid
1990s, large retailers have better information and often control access to a large number of
consumers and can dictate their needs to their suppliers. They also suggest that the FTA
and NAFTA have made the manufacturing sector in Canada more competitive and that this
may have decreased manufacturers’ bargaining position with retailers. This shift may have
lowered costs for retailers and may allow them to write contracts with suppliers which has
changed the retailers’ exposure to exchange rate ﬂuctuations.
Baldwin and Gu (2004) examine ﬁrm entry and exit and productivity growth in the
Canadian retail trade sector during the 1990s. They note that this sector is characterized
by a high degree of ﬁrm turnover. Their main conclusion is that much of the productivity
growth in Canadian retail results from more productive entering ﬁrms displacing exiting
ﬁrms that are less productive. They also argue that the importance of this entry and exit
for productivity growth increase in the 1990s.
165.2 Changes in Competition
The changes in the Canadian (and U.S.) retailing sector described above suggest that the
nature of competition in that sector has changed dramatically over the last ﬁfteen to twenty
years. If this is the case, then the way that prices are determined in this sector, the ﬂexibility
of those prices, and the relationship between cost movements (possibly due to exchange rate
movements) and prices may have changed as well.
A survey of price-setting behaviour in Canada by Amirault, Kwan, and Wilkinson (2005)
explores the question of why ﬁrms that reported increased price ﬂexibility have adjusted
their pricing behaviour. The three most important factors cited, in order of importance, were
increased competition, increased use of information technology, and increased volatility
of input costs. The discussion of changes in retailing above are consistent with the important
role of the ﬁrst two factors in aﬀecting price setting behaviour in this sector. In this same
survey, nearly 75% of respondents in the wholesale and retail trade sector stated that the
number of competitors that they faced had changed.
A common element in the responses of ﬁrms to both of the surveys discussed above
and the literature on retailing is a perception that competition has increased in this sector.
Exactly what this means is an open question. At least two possibilities come to mind. First,
economists often consider measures of concentration as an indication of how competitive an
industry is (see Tirole (1988)) with higher concentration associated with less competition.
Second, mark-ups of cost over price are often considered a measure of ﬁrms’ market power
with higher mark-ups associated with more market power and less competition. The question
then arises as to the nature of the trends in concentration and mark-ups in the Canadian
retail sector over the time period under consideration. We ﬁrst discuss concentration trends.
Much of the literature on retailing trends that we have reviewed above suggests that the
entry of big-box retailers and exit of smaller retailers suggests a shift in market share away
from smaller ﬁrms toward much larger ﬁrms. This is suggestive of increased concentration
in this sector in both Canada and the U.S. Baldwin and Gu (2004), however, argue that
the Canadian retail sector has become slightly less concentrated during the 1990s as their
measure of the Herﬁndahl concentration index decreased from .01 to .005 from 1990-1997.
They also argue that over the last decade competition has become more intense in Canadian
retail due to entry of big box stores from the U.S. Clearly, more work needs to be done to
carefully document trends in concentration in Canadian retail.
We now turn to mark-ups as a measure of the degree of competition. As mentioned above,
the surveys suggest that incumbents perceive the industry as more competitive. This suggests
17that they have less market power than in the past and that their mark-ups may be lower.
This is one interpretation of the survey results. It is diﬃcult, if not impossible, however, to
measure mark-ups of a particular set of ﬁrms because their costs are not observable. Instead,
now examine trends in estimates of average mark-ups in Canadian retail.
To do this, we extend the methodology of Roeger (1995) to account for changes in returns
to scale to provide evidence on changes in mark-ups in Canadian retailing. Our results suggest
that under the assumption of constant returns to scale, the mark-up in Canadian retailing
has fallen by 3% between the 1976-1983 and the 1984-1997 periods. However, this decline
can also be interpreted as a rise in the returns to scale so these estimates are biased if returns
to scale have also changed over this time period. Once we allow for changes in the returns
to scale, we estimate that the mark-up in retail trade declined by 8% over this time period.
The methodology developed by Hall (1988) forms the basis of many approaches to study-
ing the cyclical behavior of mark-ups. The estimating equation used in this approach is
derived by manipulating a Solow residual for a production function that uses capital and
labour and is homogeneous of degree γ. That equation is as follows:
Δ(yt − kt)=mtαtΔ(lt − kt)+( γ − 1)Δkt +Δ at +  t, (11)
where yt, kt, lt, and at are logs of real output, capital, labour, and a technology index.
Furthermore, mt is the mark-up and αt is labour share. Hall (1988) pointed out that (??)
should be estimated using an instrumental variables (IV ) approach. However, it is not easy
to ﬁnd instruments that are suﬃciently correlated with the regressors.
Roeger (1995) proposed an extension to Hall’s approach that elimnated the need to use
IV estimation. He showed that under constant returns to scale, the diﬀerence between the
standard production-based Solow residual and the cost-based Solow residual is a function of






(Δyt +Δ pt − (Δkt +Δ rt))+ t,
(12)
where pt, wt, and rt are the price of the good, the wage, and the rental price of capital.
There are two advantages to estimation this equation compared to equation (??). First, the
technology term is not present and second, only nominal variables appear in the regression.
A drawback of the approach is that it assumes constant returns.







(Δyt +Δ pt − (Δkt +Δ rt))+ t,
(13)
18Now note that the only diﬀerence between equation (??) and (??) is the interpretation of the
coeﬃcient on the output to capital ratio has changed. Thus, any changes over time found
in Roeger’s approach could also be interpreted as changes in γ. For example, a decline in m
cannot be distinguished from an increase in γ.
Kee(2002) showed that (??) can be rearranged and expressed as
Δyt +Δ pt − αt(Δlt +Δ wt) − (1 − αt)(Δkt +Δ rt)
=( m − 1)αt [Δlt +Δ wt) − (Δkt +Δ rt)] + (γ − 1)[Δkt +Δ rt) − (Δyt +Δ pt)] +  t, (14)
To overcome the collinearity problem noted by Kee(2002) in this approach, we used ridge
regressions to estimate this equation. The ridge estimation is b =( X X + kI)−1X y, where
k is a small constant and I is the identity matrix. The value of k used here was .1. DIﬀerent
values of k were found to change the size of the estimated coeﬃcients but the pattern of
change overtime was generally preserved.
The data used in this exercise were as follows. Quantity indices for capital, nominal gross
output and labor, energy, material and service costs for retail trade are taken from Statistics
Canada’s KLEMS database for 1961-1997 and 1981-1997. All data are annual. Although
capital costs are included in KLEMS, they are not used here because they are derived under
the assumption of CRS and zero mark-ups. Instead the user cost of capital is constructed
using other Statistics Canada sources. The use cost is approximated by r = pi(i − π + δ),
where pi is the industry speciﬁc price of investment, i in the nominal interest rate on ten-
year Government of Canada bonds, π is the growth rate of the GDP deﬂator, and δ is the
industry speciﬁc depreciation rate.
Tables 1 and 2 present preliminary estimates of markups in the Canadian retail sector
for diﬀerent sub-periods. The top row of Table 1 presents estimates of the markup using the
full samples of both KLEMS data sets using Roeger’s original approach (see equation (??)).
Regressions with a rolling window of nine years are estimated to examine how markups have
changed over time. In each of the trade industries, there is some indication that markups
have fallen at the end of the sample.
The most likely break point is found by examining the SupF statistic in the fashion of
Bai and Perron (1998). If the date with the largest F-statistic is assumed to be known
beforehand, a statistically signiﬁcant decline in the markup can be found for retail trade
during the 1980’s. That is, the estimated markup falls by 3 per cent from 1.17 before 1984
to 1.13 afterward.
If we allow for increasing returns to scale using the extension of Roeger’s (1995) approach
given by equation (??), we obtain the estimates presented in Table 2. This table indicates
19Table 1: Retail Average Markups Under CRS
KLEMS Vintage 1981-1997 1961-1997
Full Sample 1.1413 1.1494
(.0249) (.0085)










Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Estimates obtained using the approach of Roeger (1995) (see equation (refroeg)).
that our estimates of the markup suggest a signiﬁcant fall of 8% between the 1973-1983 and
the 1984-1997 periods. In addition, Figure 1 plots the average markups at the midpoints of
rolloing samples with a window of nine years. For example, the markup plotted in that ﬁgure
for 1993 is the average markup for the period 1989-1997. This ﬁgure suggests a decline in
the average markup beginning in the late 1980s. We also see from Table 2 that our estimates
of returns to scale in retail trade have decline between the 1973-1983 and the 1984-1997
periods.
These preliminary estimates suggest a decline in markups in retail where the timing of
the decline is roughly in line with the decrease in exchange rate pass-through. Thus one
explanation for the fall in pass-through is that the restructuring in the retail sector which
has led to increased competition and, possibly, lower mark-ups may have also decreased pass-
through. Exploration of such a conjecture using a theoretical model requires environments
with imperfect competition and strategic price setting. We pursue this approach in the
following sections. We ﬁrst brieﬂy discuss approaches in the industrial organization literature
for studying pass-through with strategic ﬁrms. We then present a series of strategic price
setting models and evaluate the eﬀects of various forms of restructuring on incumbents’
markups, average markups, and pass-through. We argue that a form of restructuring which
is in line with the expansion of giant retailers may be generally consistent with these trends.
20Table 2: Retail Average Markups and Returns to Scale
Markup Returns to Scale








Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Estimates obtained using and extension of the approach of Roeger (1995) (see
equation (refkee)).
6 Industrial Organization Models of Pass-Through
As discussed above, a common modeling approach in macroeconomic models with nominal
rigidities which examine pass-through and real exchange rate behaviour is to adopt a monop-
olistic competition industry structure. These papers also typically specify utility functions
which give rise to demand functions with a constant elasticity of demand. In such an en-
vironment, ﬁrms do not interact strategically with one another but instead set prices at a
constant mark-up (which is dictated by the elasticity of demand) over costs or expected costs.
This approach to studying exchange rate pass-through stands in stark contrast to the more
microeconomic oriented literature which began in the late 1980s. These studies emphasized
industrial organization, market segmentation, and price discrimination and explored indus-
try structures which are characterized by strategic pricing. Because of the incorporation
of strategic considerations, these articles were able to shed light on links between industry
characteristics and pass-through. We now brieﬂy discuss some of the papers in this area.
One of the earliest papers in this area was by Dornbusch (1987) who explored various
models of industrial organization. In each environment he presents, there are a set of domes-
tic ﬁrms and a set of foreign ﬁrms who compete in both the home and foreign markets. The
markets, however, are segmented so ﬁrms can perfectly price discriminate across markets.
In this context, he explores three market structures with strategic price setting: Cournot
competition with a homogeneous good; diﬀerentiated product competition where a represen-
tative consumer desires variety; and diﬀerentiated product competition with heterogeneous
consumers. Exogenous movements in the exchange rate change the relative unit labour costs
across domestic and foreign producers and causes equilibrium price adjustments. He demon-
21strates that in these models, the extent of these equilibrium price responses to exchange rate
movements depends on industry characteristics such as the degree of market concentration,
product substitutability, and import penetration. Feinberg (1989) ﬁnds similar results in a
model with diﬀerentiated products and conjectural variations.
More recent work has explored other environments of strategic pricing to analyze relation-
ships between industry characteristics and pass-through. One example is Feenstra, Gagnon,
and Knetter (1996) who explore price setting behaviour among domestic and foreign ﬁrms
selling diﬀerentiated products and focus on the relationship between import penetration and
pass-through. They demonstrate that pass-through is a non-monotonic function of ﬁrms’
market shares and argue that this relationship is consistent with pass-through to automo-
bile prices. Yang (1997) employs a model of product diﬀerentiation and variable marginal
costs to argue that pass-through is related to the degree of product diﬀerentiation. Kardasz
and Stollery (2001) examine pass-through in a model with a set of foreign ﬁrms and a set
of domestic ﬁrms selling products which are close substitutes. Their model predicts that
pass-through will depend upon, among other things, the proportion of costs accounted for
by imports and number of ﬁrms in the industry.
All of the papers we have just reviewed examine pass-through in static environments. In-
corporating dynamics into models with strategic price setting and pass-through is inherently
diﬃcult because of the complexities associated with analyzing dynamic games. Nonetheless,
a small number of papers have done so. Froot and Klemperer (1989) examine pass-through
to import prices when ﬁrms’ future demands depend on current market shares in a two
period duopoly model. They demonstrate that in this environment that the degree of pass-
through depends on whether exchange rate movements are permanent or transitory. Lapham
(1995) incorporates adjustment costs in a model with strategic price setting of diﬀerentiated
products to examine the persistence properties of pass-through.
To conclude, there is a sizable literature on industrial organization models of exchange
rate pass-through with strategic elements and we certainly have not provided an exhaus-
tive survey. This section is simply meant to give the reader a sense of the approaches in
this area and how these approaches diﬀer from models of monopolistic competition with
constant mark-ups. These strategic models of price setting have received little attention in
the macroeconomic literature on pass-through and real exchange rates, partly because of
the technical diﬃculty involved in analyzing strategic ﬁrms in dynamic, stochastic, general
equilibrium models. This is certainly an important area for future work.
In the next section, we explore a model of a diﬀerentiated product oligopoly which is
consistent with the strategic approach to pass-through. We use the model to examine various
22forms of restructuring and discuss the potential for such an approach to explain the trends
in Canadian retailing (including pass-through) discussed above. In Section 8, we examine a
model of a homogeneous product oligopoly.
7 Diﬀerentiated Product Oligopoly Model
7.1 Industry Description
Here we consider an economy of strategic price setting among ﬁrms which produce diﬀeren-
tiated products. Firms can compete in quantities or prices. Assume that there are initially
N domestic retailers who are price setters.
There is a representative consumer who desires variety and has preferences given by
U(qo,q 1,...,qN;γ), (15)
where qo is consumption of an outside numeraire good and qj is consumption of diﬀerenti-
ated good j. The parameter γ represents utility parameters which may change over time
(i.e. demand shifters). These preferences give rise to the following demand function for
diﬀerentiated good j
qj(po,p 1,...,pN,I,γ), (16)
where po is the price of the outside good, pj is the price of diﬀerentiated good j, and I is the
consumer’s income (exogenous at this point). Letting p ≡ p1,...,pN, we denote the demand










Retaliers operate constant returns to scale technologies using domestic inputs which are
priced in domestic currency and imported inputs which are priced in foreign currency. Re-
tailers are price takers in all input markets and all face the same price of inputs. Associated
with the technologies used by retailers are unit cost functions denominated in domestic cur-
rency. The cost functions are a function of the price of domestic inputs, w (expressed in
domestic currency), the price of imported inputs, wF (expressed in foreign currency), and
the spot exchange rate, s (domestic currency per unit of foreign currency). The unit cost
function for retailer j is denoted cj(s,w,wF).
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cj (19)
Solving this system of N equations gives equilibrium prices, p∗
j(s,w,wF,I,γ,N) and the
equilibrium price vector p∗.
7.2 Equilibrium Pass-Through
Logging and diﬀerentiating this with respect to the log of the exchange rate gives the following










ji ≡ φji(po,p∗,I,γ),  ∗
j ≡  j(po,p∗,I,γ), p∗, and ˆ cjs is the elasticity of the cost
function with respect to the exchange rate. Now solving this system of N equations gives
equilibrium pass-through of exchange rates to the price of each retailer: β∗
j(s,w,wF,I,γ,N)
If we consider a symmetric equilibrium in which ∀j, cj = c,  ∗
j =  ∗, φ∗
jj = φ∗, and
φ∗
ji = ν∗, then equilibrium pass-through by an individual retailer equals
β∗(s,w,wF,I,γ,N)=
 
 ∗ − 1
 ∗ − 1+φ∗ +( N − 1)ν∗
 
ˆ cs. (21)
Now, under constant-returns-to-scale production, we know that 0 < ˆ cs ≤ 1 and ˆ cs =1i f
there are no domestic inputs. Given that empirical estimates of pass-through are generally
less than one (incomplete pass-through), we wish to restrict attention to environments in
which pass-through is no greater than one even in the absence of domestic inputs. We see
from equation (??) that this requires restricting attention to utility functions which give rise
to demand functions for which φ∗ +( N − 1)ν∗ > 0 in the symmetric case.
In the symmetric case, we ﬁrst consider the question as to whether a change in an economy
parameter (which we will term as a “minor restructuring”) can simultaneously lead to lower
pass-through and more competition as measured by lower average mark-ups. In the next
section we consider more major forms of restructuring under a speciﬁc form of the utility
24function which has been used in other applications in international economics. Consider, for
example, a change in the number of ﬁrms (simple exogenous entry or exit.)
The elasticity of the equilibrium price and the mark-up of a representative ﬁrm with





 ∗ − 1+φ∗ +( N − 1)ν∗.
We generally expect ˆ  ∗
N ≥ 0 so we expect the price and mark-up to be non-increasing in the
number of ﬁrms. Thus, if we associate an increase in competition with a fall in mark-ups,
then to generate such a change with this form of minor restructuring, we would require a rise
in the number of ﬁrms (and an associated fall in concentration). The question then arises as
to whether such an increase in the number of ﬁrms would also lead to a fall in pass-through.
Unfortunately, without a speciﬁc form of utility and, therefore, demand, the derivative
of the pass-through expression given by equation (??) with respect to the number of ﬁrms
cannot be signed in general. However, we have examined this derivative for a number of
speciﬁc demand functions including (1) constant-elasticity-of substitution demand functions
with a large number of ﬁrms, (2) constant-elasticity-of substitution demand functions with
a small number of ﬁrms, (3) a characteristics approach to diﬀerentiated products where
consumers are distributed around a circle according to their ideal variety (Salop (1979)),
and (4) those arising from the utility function analyzed in the next subsection. In all of
those examples pass-through is non-decreasing in the number of ﬁrms (the derivations for
the ﬁrst three speciﬁcations are not included in the paper). Hence, a rise in the number of
ﬁrms appears to increase pass-through under many speciﬁcations for diﬀerentiated products.
These results suggest that in this type of model, exogenous entry and exit alone cannot
simultaneously generate a situation of increased competition (i.e. a fall in mark-ups) and
a fall in pass-through. Another possible form of minor restructuring would be a change
in the degree of product substitutability among the diﬀerentiated products. In the general
speciﬁcation above, we do not have a single parameter which controls this (although an
element of γ could be interpreted as such). However, we would generally expect an increase in
product substitutability to decrease prices and mark-ups in equilibrium. Again, determining
the eﬀect on pass-through is diﬃcult but as mark-ups fall we expect them to become less
sensitive to cost changes and, hence, we expect more pass-through. It is shown in the
next subsection that this conjecture is veriﬁed for the speciﬁc form of the utility function
analyzed there. Thus, again such a minor restructuring has diﬃculty generating an industry
characterized by both more competition and lower pass-through. We now turn to an analysis
of more major forms of restructuring with a speciﬁc demand function.
257.3 “Major” Restructuring
As the discussion of Canadian retailing trends in Section 5 suggests, this sector appears
to have faced more signiﬁcant changes than can be captured by simple comparative statics
exercises on economy parameters. An alternate approach is to consider the possibility that
restructuring caused the form of competition in the retail sector to change. In this case,
the change could potentially lead to lower pass-through and a perception by incumbents that
the industry is more competitive. We consider three possible forms of restructuring which
could be argued to be in the spirit of the trends discussed in Section 5 (i.e. entry by big box
retailers with a cost advantage and exit of smaller retailers.) They are as follows: (1) Entry
by a lower cost ﬁrm with all ﬁrms choosing prices simultaneously (a Nash equilibrium); (2)
Entry by a ﬁrm with the same costs as incumbents with the entrant choosing her price before
her rivals (a symmetric Stackelberg equilibrium); and (3) Entry by a lower cost ﬁrm with the
entrant choosing her price before her rivals (an asymmetric Stackelberg equilibrium). In each
of these cases, we also allow for exit by a subset of incumbents. Now, the ﬁrst restructuring
could be interpreted as the case in which Wal-Mart enters with a cost advantage but does
not act as a price leader. The second is Wal-Mart entering with no cost advantage but acting
as a price leader and the third is this case but with Wal-Mart enjoying a cost advantage. It
might be argued that the ﬁnal case best captures the retail trends discussed in Section 5.
To analyze these three forms of major restructuring, we specify a particular form for the
utility function which is tractable yet which leads to strategic interaction among retailers in
a price setting game. The preference speciﬁcation we use is taken from Melitz and Ottaviano
(2005):












where we have assumed there is a continuum of diﬀerentiated products and Ω is the set of
those products. The measure of products equals N. There is a unit measure of consumers
all with the same utility function. Now increases in δ>0 and decreases in η>0 increase
the demand for diﬀerentiated goods relative to the outside good. In addition, the degree of
product diﬀerentiation is increasing in σ>0. It is assumed that there is positive demand














where ¯ p ≡ (1/N)
 
i∈Ω pidi is the average price. We note that when a retailer chooses her
price to maximize proﬁts, she takes ¯ p as given because there is a continuum of ﬁrms.






where zj is a ﬁrm speciﬁc technology parameter, mj is input of imported goods, and lj is
input of domestic labor. Imported intermediates are denominated in foreign currency and
have a unit price of wF. The domestic wage is w and the spot exchange rate (domestic to
foreign currency) is denoted s. This gives rise to the following unit cost function for retailer







j (1 − αj)1−αj
  (25)
Thus, we have the following elasticity of the cost function with respect to the exchange rate
for retailer j:
ˆ cjs = αj (26)
We ﬁrst consider a symmetric equilibrium in which ﬁrms all face the same technologies:
zj = z and αj = α ∀j. In this case, the equilibrium price of each good and equilibrium
exchange rate pass-through are given by
p∗ =






(σ + ηN)c + σδ
 
α. (28)
Now, we see from the latter expression that 0 <β ∗ < 1 because σ and δ are both positive





(σ + ηN)c + σδ
(ηN)c
. (29)
Consider again, brieﬂy the minor restructuring discussed in the last subsection. These
expressions imply that an increase in the measure of ﬁrms, N will lead to a fall in the price
and the mark-up and a rise in pass-through (as conjectured in the previous section). A fall
in σ, which implies a rise in product diﬀerentiation has the same eﬀect. We ﬁnd similar
results for changes in the other parameters of the utility function. Thus, this economy
supports the hypothesis that minor changes in the economy cannot reconcile both increased
competition (lower mark-ups) and lower pass-through. We now consider the three forms of
major restructuring listed above.
Imagine that the economy is in the symmetric equilibrium described here. Then suppose
that a single ﬁrm enters with a superior technology that gives rise to a lower unit cost than






Let variables for the incumbents be denoted with an “H” and their technologies are charac-
terized by zH <z L and αH = αL = α. This, of course gives rise to the following relationship
between unit costs: cH(s,w,wF) >c L(s,w,wF). Firms choose prices simultaneously and we
consider various levels of exit of incumbents.
In Appendix 1 (forthcoming), we derive equilibrium levels of prices for the low cost
entrant and the high cost incumbents as a function of preference parameters, costs of each
type of retailer, and the number of retailers in this asymmetric Nash equilibrium. Let those
equilibrium prices be denoted p∗
L for the entrant and p∗
H for each incumbent. We also denote
the mark-up of each type of ﬁrm as μ∗
j ≡ p∗
j/c∗
j for j ∈ [L,H].
Now we seek to examine pass-through of exchange rate movements to an average price for
the industry. We construct such a price index using a weighted average of ﬁrms’ prices with
weights equal to expenditure (market shares). This is broadly consistent with construction
of the CPI in the data.












j is equilibrium output by a type j ﬁrm, and N is the total number of retailers
operating in the industry. Then the equilibrium price index is deﬁned as follows:
P∗ = rLpL +( N − 1)rHpH. (31)
Our measure of pass-through then is deﬁned as the elasticity of this price index with respect
to the exchange rate .
We are also interested in a measure of the average mark-up as well as the individual
mark-ups μL and μH. It is not obvious how to measure the average mark-up so we consider












3 ≡ rLμL +( N − 1)rHμH, (34)
where ¯ c =( cL+(N −1)cH)/N is average cost. Below we examine the eﬀects of restructuring
on each of these measures of the average mark-up.
28Now, even with a particular speciﬁcation for the demand function, it is diﬃcult to perform
analytical comparisons between the original symmetric Nash economy and this asymmetric
Nash economy. Instead, we present the results of numerical experiments to determine the
eﬀects of this form of restructuring on pass-through and both ﬁrm level and average mark-
ups. In each of the experiments, we choose the following economy parameters for illustrative
purposes but our general conclusions do not appear sensitive to our choices. For preferences,
we chose δ =1 .2, σ =2 .5, η = .05. We set the number of ﬁrms in the original equilibrium
(before entry) at N = 10. For technology parameters, we chose zH =2 ,zL =2 .5, α = .4
and for the exchange rate and input prices we use s = w = wF = 1. These values implied
average and ﬁrm-level markups of approximately μ∗ = 10% and a pass-through coeﬃcient of
approximately β∗ = .2 in the symmetric Nash equilibrium. These values are not inconsistent
with empirical estimates prior to the fall in pass-through in Canada.
In what follows we present ﬁgures which depict percentage diﬀerences in relevant economy
variables under the restructuring from their equilibrium values before the restructuring (i.e.
in the symmetric Nash equilibrium) for various levels of exit of incumbents. Figures 2-3
presents these values for the price index, pass-through, and our three measures of the average
mark-up, while Figure 4 depicts ﬁrm-level mark-ups under the ﬁrst form of restructuring.
We see from Figure 2 that entry by the low cost ﬁrm, not surprisingly, lowers the price
index in the industry. The entry of a low cost ﬁrm also leads to lower levels of pass-through
and higher levels of average mark-ups, although the degree of the increase depends on our
measure of this variable. Figure 4 shows, as expected, that incumbents prices and mark-ups
fall when the new ﬁrm enters if exit is limited. Of course, if there is enough exit, incumbents
enjoy more market power and their prices and mark-ups may rise above their original level.
We conclude from this exercise (and exercises with other economy parameter values)
that entry by a low cost ﬁrm alone lowers pass-through and may decrease the mark-ups of
incumbents (and, thus, lead a perception on their part that the market is more competitive.)
We do see, however, that our measures of the average mark-up rise due to the market power
of the low-cost entrant. Thus, this form of restructuring could lead to lower pass-through
and a view by incumbents of more competition as their mark-up falls, perhaps leading to
exit. We now consider two other forms of more major restructuring.
We again imagine that the economy is initially in the symmetric Nash equilibrium. Now
suppose that a ﬁrm enters the industry with the same technology as incumbents but the
entrant sets her prices before her rivals and, therefore, acts as a Stackelberg leader. We can
again derive ﬁrm-level prices and mark-ups for the followers and the leader and these are
presented Appendix 1 (forthcoming). We construct a price index and measures of average
29mark-ups in the same manner as in equations (??)-( ??) and examine pass-through to
the price index. Note that under symmetric costs, the three measures of average mark-ups
are equivalent. Figures 5-7 depict the same variables as Figures 2-4 but for the symmetric
Stackelberg economy. Figure 5 shows that pass-through will fall under this restructuring
only with suﬃcient exit. A comparison of Figure 5 with Figures 6 and 7 shows, however,
that this much exit will also lead to a rise the average mark-up and in the mark-ups of
incumbents which we have argued is inconsistent with their perception of a more competitive
environment. Thus, we would conclude that this form of restructuring is not consistent with
both lower pass-through and a higher perceived level of competition.
In our ﬁnal restructuring exercise, we allow the entrant to have a superior technology
and to act as a price leader in the price setting game. Figures 8-10 show variables for this
asymmetric Stackelberg case. Here we see that this form of restructuring leads to a fall in
pass-through even when there is no exit by incumbents. Figure 10 further demonstrates
that if exit by incumbents is limited then the mark-up of remaining incumbents falls as well.
Thus, we have an economy in which entry by a low-cost price leader generates both a fall
in pass-through and a fall in incumbents mark-ups. We also see, however, that this change
increases our measure of average mark-ups (although the second measure rises by very little)
because the entrant enjoys considerable market power and has relatively high mark-ups.
We see then that the conclusions we drew for the asymmetric Nash case hold in the
asymmetric Stackelberg case as well but the quantitative eﬀects are stronger in the latter
case. Comparing Figures 2 and 8, we see that pass-through falls by more in the Stackelberg
equilibrium than in the Nash equilibrium. We also see that the mark-up by incumbents falls
by more in the Stackelberg case by comparing Figures 4 and 10.
One might argue that the last form of restructuring we considered may be the closest to
capturing some of the features of entry by big-box retailers such as Wal-Mart into Canada.
Our ﬁnal results suggest that this form of restructuring may be part of the explanation for
the fall in pass-through of exchange rates to retail prices in Canada. We also note that if
these large retailers are able to write contracts which insulate their costs more from exchange
rate movements than their smaller rivals (i.e. they have a lower α), then pass-through after
their entry would be even lower than in the case presented above. Clearly, further work needs
to be done to quantify the eﬀects we have identiﬁed and generalize the results to other forms
of demand functions. We now turn to a similiar analysis in an economy with homogeneous
products.
308 Homogeneous Product Models
8.1 Industry Description
We now examine an economy of strategic price setting among identical ﬁrms. Assume that
the industry consists of N retailers who produce a homogeneous good and choose quantities.
Let the demand function for the good of interest be represented by an inverse demand
function given by
P(Q,po,I,γ) (35)
where Q is total output of the good, po is the price of an outside good (the numeraire), I is
income, and γ is a vector of preference and economy parameters which aﬀect demand.















For our purposes,  ,φ, and ψ will be suﬃcient to characterize the properties of the demand
function which are relevant for pass-through. All ﬁrms face the same technology as described
in the previous section and are summarized by unit cost functions.
Let qj denote the output of ﬁrm j and we note that Q ≡
 N
j=1 qj. The proﬁt maximiza-



















In the symmetric equilibrium, qj = q for all j and Q = Nq. Substituting this into the
ﬁrm’s ﬁrst-order necessary condition gives the equilibrium price of the good as a function of




N ∗(s,Z) − 1
 
c (41)
where Z ≡ (w,wF,p o,I,γ,N) and  ∗(s,Z) ≡  (p∗(s,Z),p o,I,γ).
318.2 Equilibrium Pass-Through
Logging and diﬀerentiating the equilibrium price with respect to the log of the exchange rate
gives our expression for pass-through:
β∗(s,Z)=
 
N ∗(s,Z) − 1
N ∗(s,Z) − 1+φ∗(s,Z)
 
ˆ cs (42)
where φ∗(s,Z) ≡ φ(p∗(s,Z),p o,I,γ) and ˆ cs > 0 is the elasticity of the cost function with
respect to the exchange rate. Henceforth, the arguments (s,Z) of equilibrium functions are
suppressed so we can write equation (??)a s
β∗ =
 
N ∗ − 1
N ∗ − 1+φ∗
 
ˆ cs. (43)




N ∗ − 1
 
. (44)
As in the previous section, we wish to restrict attention to environments in which pass-
through is no greater than one even in the absence of domestic inputs. We see from equation
(??) that this requires restricting attention to demand functions for which the elasticity
of demand is non-decreasing in price (φ∗ ≥ 0). As is clear from equation (??) and the
discussion in Section 3, this restriction on demand implies that equilibrium mark-ups will be
non-increasing functions of the exchange rate. We can also clearly see from these expressions
that for demand functions which exhibit constant elasticity of demand (φ∗ = 0), that the
mark-up is constant and exchange rate pass-through to price is completely determined by
exchange rate pass-through to costs.
When the mark-up is not constant, these equations demonstrate that this Cournot model
of strategic pricing has the feature that market conditions (N), demand conditions (po,I,γ),
and cost conditions (including the exchange rate) (s,wF,w,ˆ cs) will generally aﬀect the pass-
through of exchange rates to prices. To better understand these eﬀects, the following table
gives the price, mark-up, and pass-through elasticities with respect to the parameters of the
model.
Table 3: Price, Mark-up, and Exchange Rate Pass-Through Elasticities in Cournot Model
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[(n ∗(φ∗ − ψ∗)+ψ∗)] +
∂ln(ˆ cs)
∂ln(w)
In this table, ψ∗ ≡ ψ(p∗,p o,I,γ) and the elasticities  , φ, and ψ, are as deﬁned by equations
(??), (??), and (??) evaluated at the equilibrium price. This table demonstrates that a
general determination of the eﬀect of changes in demand conditions, technologies, factor
prices, and market conditions on exchange rate pass-through will be diﬃcult in the presence
of strategic pricing.
We now turn the question of whether minor restructuring in such a model can simul-
taneously lead to lower pass-through and lower mark-ups. Consider ﬁrst a change in the
number of ﬁrms. From Table 3, we see that a rise in N will decrease both the price and the
mark-up, as expected. The table also indicates that the sign of the pass-through elasticity
with respect to the number of ﬁrms is given by the sign of N + ψ>0. This is diﬃcult to
sign for general demand functions, however, in the demand example we consider below and
in the examples presented in Appendix 2, this expression is always non-negative indicating
that pass-through is increasing in the number of ﬁrms. So, a rise in the number of ﬁrms
which lowers the mark-up will increase pass-through. This is consistent with our ﬁndings in
the diﬀerentiated product model presented in the previous section.
8.3 “Major” Restructuring
As in the diﬀerentiated product model, we seek to determine the eﬀects on mark-ups and
pass-through of the three types of restructuring described above. We begin by comparing
the symmetric Nash equilibrium to an asymmetric Nash equilibrium as follows. Consider
33an industry with N  ≤ N ﬁrms of two types. There are H ≥ 0 ﬁrms who have identical
technologies to the ﬁrms in the symmetric equilibrium (“high cost ﬁrms”) and we denote
their cost function as cH(s,w,wF). There are L = N −H ﬁrms who have technologies which
give rise to a unit cost function given by cL(s,w,wF) with cL <c H and with an exchange
rate elasticity given by ˆ cLs ≤ ˆ cHs. These are “low cost ﬁrms” with superior technologies and
costs which are possibly more insulated from exchange rate movements. We assume that
these new ﬁrms replace existing ﬁrms one-for-one so the number of ﬁrms stays constant or
that there is more exit of old ﬁrms than entry of new ﬁrms so the total number of ﬁrms falls.
Let C  denote total costs in the new equilibrium with C  ≡ HcH + LcL.
We can show that this new equilibrium will be characterized by the following equilibrium









N    − 1




where    ≡  (p ,p o,I,γ), φ  ≡ φ(p,po,I,γ), and ˆ C 
s = HcHˆ cHs+LcLˆ cLs
C  . As before, we restrict
attention to preferences for which φ  > 0 so that pass-through is incomplete even when there
are no domestic inputs.
Let the average mark-up be deﬁned as the ratio of price to average cost and denote it ¯ μ :
¯ μ  =
N p 
C  , (47)
where we have used C
 
N  to measure average cost.
Letting a superscript ∗ denote equilibrium values in the symmetric Cournot Nash equilib-
rium, we have the following proposition which compares prices, mark-ups, and pass-through
between the two economies.
Proposition 1:
1. (a) If N  = N, p  <p ∗
(b) If N  <N, the price eﬀect is ambiguous
2. ¯ μ  >μ ∗
3. If N  (φ  − ψ )+ψ  > 0, then
(a) If N  = N, β 
s ≤ β∗
s
(b) If N  <Nand p  <p ∗, β 
s ≤ β∗
s
Proofs of propositions are available from the author upon request.
34This proposition states that if the number of ﬁrms does not fall in the new equilibrium,
then the new price will be lower because average costs are lower. If, however, there is enough
exit, then the lower degree of competition due to exit can lead to higher prices. We also
see that the new equilibrium will be characterized by higher average mark-ups. The average
mark-up rises when the price falls because incomplete pass-through implies that the fall in
average costs is not fully passed through to the price. By deﬁnition, the average mark-up
must rise when the price rises and the average cost falls. Thus, this approach to modeling
restructuring does not lead to lower average mark-ups.
Regarding pass-through, if the suﬃcient condition of part (3) of the proposition is met,
then pass-through falls because low cost ﬁrms potentially have lower cost elasticities and
because the presence of lower cost ﬁrms increases competition which induces lower pass-
through. Note that the condition of the proposition is suﬃcient but not necessary for lower
price pass-through. In particular, if the condition of the proposition holds, then lower pass-
through of exchange rates to costs by low cost ﬁrms is suﬃcient but not necessary for lower
pass-through of exchange rates to prices. In all the demand examples we considered below
the condition is met and pass-through is lower in the asymmetric equilibrium.
To summarize, this type of a shift in the industry where a subset of ﬁrms experience
a fall in costs but ﬁrms continue to play a Nash quantity setting game is consistent with
lower pass-through, but not lower mark-ups. We now examine the two remaining forms of
restructuring.
We now compare the symmetric Cournot Nash equilibrium to an equilibrium with N  ≤ N
ﬁrms where one of the ﬁrms is a Stackelberg leader. There are N  − 1 ﬁrms with the same
unit cost function (cH(·)) as in the symmetric Cournot Nash economy who are followers. The
leader has unit costs, cL(·), which may be lower than the followers and has a cost elasticity
with respect to the exchange rate which is no larger than the followers.
Let qL be the equilibrium output of the Stackelberg leader and let qH be the equilibrium
output of a representative follower. Then equilibrium aggregate output in this environment
is Q  ≡ qL +(H  −1)qH. We begin with the proﬁt maximization problem of a representative











Taking the ﬁrst-order condition for a solution to this maximization problem and imposing
symmetry among the followers allow us to derive the following expression which implicitly
deﬁnes the best response of followers to a quantity choice by the leader which we denote as
35˜ qH(qL):
(˜ p − cH)(˜   ˜ Q) − ˜ p˜ qH =0 , (48)
where ˜ Q = qL +( N  − 1)˜ qH,˜ p = P( ˜ Q,po,I,γ), and ˜   =  (˜ p,po,I,γ).











The ﬁrst-order necessary condition for the leader can be rearranged and combined with the
best response function of the followers and the industry demand function to derive the system
of equilibrium equations. These equations are given below and can be solved to determine
the equilibrium industry price output of the leader:
p  =
⎡
⎣   Q 







qH =˜ qH(qL) (50)
p  = P(Q ,p o,I,γ) (51)
Now, this is a complicated system of equations and it is diﬃcult to draw any general
conclusions regarding mark-ups and pass-through with general demand. Instead, as with the
diﬀerentiated products model, we specify a particular demand function which is tractable
and present results for that example.
8.3.1 Linear Demand Example
Let the inverse demand function for the good of interest be given by
p = γ − δQ











We note that φ∗ > 0, so pass-through is less than one even in the absence of domestic inputs
and that N ∗ + ψ∗ =  ∗(N +1 )> 0, so pass-through is increasing in the number of ﬁrms.
Thus, with linear demand, a rise in the number of ﬁrms decreases the mark-up but increases
pass-through.
In the Stackelberg economy, the best response function for the followers under the linear
demand function speciﬁed above is
˜ qH(qL)=








Substituting these into the above equations and rearranging gives the equilibrium price in
the Stackelberg economy:
p  =
γ +( N  − 1)cH + N cL
2N 
Pass-through in the Stackelberg equilibrium is given by
β  =
(N  − 1)cHˆ cHs + N cLˆ cLs
γ +( N  − 1)cH + N cL
Now, we ﬁrst focus on the case where the leader has the same unit cost function as the
followers and denote this function by c(·). We can show the following proposition in the
linear symmetric case:
Proposition 2
If ﬁrms have identical cost functions and demand is linear, then
1. Prices and mark-ups are lower in the Stackelberg equilibrium than in the Nash equi-











This proposition implies that with linear demand, we cannot simultaneously achieve lower
mark-ups and lower pass-through through this form of restructuring. In particular, if there
is suﬃcient exit, then pass-through will fall but the exit will lead to higher mark-ups.
We now turn to the case in which the leader has a cost advantage. Clearly the industry
price in this case will be lower than in the symmetric Stackelberg equilibrium. Hence,
Proposition 2 gives a suﬃcient but not necessary condition for p  <p ∗ with cost diﬀerences.
Comparisons between mark-ups and pass-through between the two economies are diﬃcult to
make even with this speciﬁc demand function. Hence, to make these comparisons, we resort
to numerical examples.
To illustrate that the economy with Stackelberg competition with a leader with a cost
advantage can simultaneously generate lower mark-ups and lower pass-through , we present
a illustrative numerical example with the following economy parameters: γ =2 ,δ =1 ,
s = wF = w = 1. We let the technologies be given by the Cobb-Douglas production
functions speciﬁed in the diﬀerentiated products model. When we assume that ﬁrms have
37identical technologies, we let zj =2∀j and αj = .5 ∀j. When ﬁrms have asymmetric costs
but symmetric cost elasticities with respect to the exchange rate, we let the high cost ﬁrms
have zH = 2 and low cost ﬁrms have zL =2 .5. Under asymmetric cost elasticities, we
let αH = .5 and αL = .4 so ﬁrms with αL have lower cost elasticities with respect to the
exchange rate.
Figures 11-13 present the percentage diﬀerences between the alternate economies with
symmetric cost elasticities and the benchmark economy of symmetric Nash competition
for the two variables of primary interest: mark-ups and pass-through. Those ﬁgures plot
these diﬀerences as a function of the number of ﬁrms which exit in the new economy. A
positive diﬀerence indicates that the variable is higher in the new economy than in the
symmetric Nash economy. Figure 11 shows the results in Table 1 for a change in the number
of ﬁrms. Figures 12 and 13 illustrate the analytical results presented in Propositions 1 and 2
respectively. Taken together, these ﬁgures demonstrate our earlier conclusion that the ﬁrst
three types of restructuring (exit, entry by a cost leader, and entry by a quantity leader)
are not consistent with both lower mark-ups and lower pass-through. Figure 14 indicates
that if there is enough exit in the Stackelberg economy with cost asymmetries, then both
pass-through and mark-ups can be lower than in the symmetric Nash economy.
Figures 15-17 present the same variables but with asymmetric cost elasticities. Figure 17
demonstrates that mark-ups and pass-through can both be lower in the new economy even
when the number of ﬁrms does not change if the leader’s costs are less responsive to exchange
rate movements. This case may most closely represent the shifts in Canadian retailing due to
the entry and expansion of big-box retailers in Canada. Retailers such as Wal-Mart may act
as industry Stackelberg leaders. Furthermore, because of their size and industry position,
they have lower production costs due to increasing returns and can eﬀectively bargain with
wholesalers and importers for lower costs and less exposure to exchange rate movements.
Smaller (perhaps independent) retailers may act as industry followers, may have higher
costs, and more exposure to exchange rate volatility. If we imagine that these ﬁrms were in
operation before the expansion of big-box retailers, then those ﬁrms who do not exit in the
aftermath, will perceive the industry as more competitive because mark-ups will be lower.
Because of these shifts in the market structure of the industry, prices will be less responsive
to exchange rate movements.
389 Conclusions and Extensions
This paper has explored two potential explanations for the observed decline in exchange rate
pass-through to consumer prices in Canada over the last two decades: a fall in inﬂation and
restructuring in the retail industry. These explanations should not be thought of as com-
peting, but rather as connected. The restructuring in Canadian retail which apparently has
increased competition in that sector may have reduced ﬁrms’ pricing power and contributed
to low inﬂation. Conversely, shifts in monetary policy toward lower inﬂation may have al-
tered consumer behaviour and may have changed the competitive environment in the retail
sector. These forces together have lowered retailers’ ability and willingness to pass-through
exchange rate movements to their prices.
More work is needed to document the trends in mark-ups in Canadian retailing because
the key to a better understanding of pass-through is a better understanding of the response
of mark-ups to movements in exchange rates. Future research on exchange rate pass-through
should focus more on microeconomic models of strategic price setting behavior in dynamic,
stochastic general equilibrium environments. Our discussion of the relationship between
inﬂation and exchange rate pass-through suggests that we also might think more carefully
about how the inﬂationary environment aﬀects ﬁrm behaviour and consumer behaviour.
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s10 Appendix 2: Demand Examples in Homogeneous
Product Model
10.1 Cobb-Douglas Utility
Suppose utility is deﬁned over the good of interest and the outside good and is given by
U(C,Co)=CoγC1−γ.





and the following elasticities:
  =1 φ =0 ψ =0 .






So here, pass-through is less than one if and only if there are domestic inputs. Furthermore,
a fall in the number of ﬁrms raises concentration and the mark-up but has no eﬀect on
pass-through
10.2 Leontief Utility






















Note that φ>0 so pass-through is less than one even when there are no domestic inputs and
n  + ψ>0 so pass-through is increasing in the number of ﬁrms. Hence a fall in the number
of ﬁrms increases concentration and mark-ups and decreases pass-through.
4310.3 Constant-Elasticity of Substitution Utility: Two Goods




+ Cγ  1
γ ,
with γ<1. Let z ≡ (P/P0)
γ
1−γ , then we have
C =
E
(z +1 ) P
,
and the following elasticities:
  =
1+z − γ
(1 − γ)(1 + z)
φ =
γ2z
(1 − γ)(1 + z)(1 + z − γ)
ψ =
γ(1 − z2 − γ)
(1 − γ)(1 + z)(1 + z − γ)
Now φ>0 so pass-through is less than one in all cases. Furthermore, we have n  + ψ =
(n − 1)  +(   + ψ), and we can show that




which is positive. Hence, pass-through falls when the number of ﬁrms falls, while concentra-
tion and the mark-up rise.
10.4 Constant-Elasticity of Substitution Utility: Many Goods
Suppose utility is deﬁned over the good of interest and many other goods as a constant-



















Hence, the mark-up and pass-through are unaﬀected by a change in the number of ﬁrms
in the industry. This is a common speciﬁcation of models with nominal rigidities where
incomplete pass-through of costs is all generated through nominal rigidities.
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